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Abstract
The mandatory Polar Code was finally adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in
May 2015. The present article examines the role and contribution of the Russian Federation in the
decision-making process of the Polar Code through its proposals, in the form of submissions, statements,
and oral interventions. The purpose of these proposals is investigated with respect to the safety and
environmental protection goals of the IMO and Russian interests in the Arctic, by looking at the reasoning
used by Russia in its proposals. The major issue areas represented in the Russian proposals include,
among others, the role of coastal State legislation, environmental regulations, and icebreaker assistance;
however, the majority of these do not contribute to the IMO’s goals of creating globally uniform standards
for maritime safety and protecting the marine environment. The Russian proposals served State interests
through misrepresentation and reference to Russia’s experience in Arctic shipping. While the latter frames
Russia as a leading user of Arctic waters, the role that Russia played in the Polar Code negotiations
indicates that Russia has more than shipping interests to protect in the Arctic.
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1. Introduction
The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) was adopted
by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in November 2014 and May
2015,1 after years of negotiations. Once it comes into force through amendments to the
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SOLAS2 and MARPOL3 Conventions,4 this new instrument will regulate ship safety
and pollution prevention in polar waters. While the Polar Code covers both the Arctic
and the Antarctic waters, the present article deals specifically with one Arctic State,
the Russian Federation, and its contribution to the negotiation process that resulted in
the Polar Code.
Russia is an important player in the Arctic from many perspectives. It has the longest
coastline facing the Arctic; the largest Arctic population of all the Arctic States; and a
proud reputation, history, and identity connected to the Arctic.5 Furthermore,
because of the resource wealth of its Arctic Zone,6 comprising hydrocarbons, timber,
minerals, as well as fish, Russia also has important industries located in the area,
providing a significant percentage of its GDP and export.7 With its long Arctic
coastline, Russia also has considerable experience in Arctic shipping. While shipping
activity in the Russian Arctic is mainly connected to resource extraction in the region
and supply routes to remote communities, part of the current Russian Arctic policy is
to encourage the use of the waters off Russia’s Arctic coast, the Northern Sea Route
(NSR),8 for international transit shipping.9 Much of the shipping activity in Russian
waters is supported by different services, such as icebreaker assistance and pilotage.
To make shipping through the NSR easier, new legislation was enacted with regard to
the NSR in 2012 and 2013.10
The main question this article seeks to answer is how Russia’s role and contribution
to the Polar Code may be characterised. In order to answer this question, the following
sub-questions are raised: 1) Did Russia have a prominent role in the negotiation of
the Polar Code? and 2) Looking at the content of its proposals, did Russia utilise its
experience in Arctic shipping to further the IMO’s goals or its own interests?
Section 2 of this article introduces the material on which the research has been based.
Section 3 examines the first sub-question raised above, with the hypothesis that
Russia’s size and stakes in the Arctic made it one of the most interested players in the
Polar Code negotiations. Section 4 deals with the content of selected Russian propo-
sals, statements, and interventions, in light of the second sub-question. First,
I introduce deliberative theory’s distinction between arguing and bargaining to help
the analysis, and define the IMO’s goals in the context of the Polar Code. The hypo-
thesis made is that, while Russia has furthered its own narrow self-interests in the polar
region, it has also been interested in enhancing safety and environmental protection
through the new Polar Code, especially since the waters north of Russia are expected to
open for ship traffic first. Thus, I will consider which Russian interests were promoted
through the Russian proposals and how these were furthered, in order to determine
whether the Russian proposals served the IMO’s goals or particular State interests.
Finally, building on the previous analyses, Section 5 discusses what Russia’s participa-
tion in the Polar Code negotiations can tell us about what kind of Arctic actor Russia is.
2. Research material
During the decision-making process of the IMO, its members and observers submit
proposals that are discussed in the different Committees, Sub-Committees, working
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groups, and correspondence groups. Below, analysis is made of Russia’s proposals to
the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and Marine Environment Protection
Committee (MEPC), as well as to the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and
Equipment (DE) and its successor, the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and
Construction (SDC), where the more detailed work on the Polar Code took place.11
Moreover, statements and interventions found in the reports of the Committees and
the two Sub-Committees are covered. Statements and interventions serve to
highlight States’ opinions that were deemed important enough to record in writing.
The documents analysed are those to which it is possible to gain public access
via the IMO’s database, IMODOCS.12 While a great number of decisions were made
in the setting of the Committees and Sub-Committees, many others were made in
intersessional and correspondence groups among those delegations most interested
in polar shipping. While the lack of available documents from these fora imposes
limitations on the present research, the volume of documents available  more than
250 in number  compensates for this. This material was further supplemented by
interviews conducted with selected delegates to the IMO bodies involved and audio
records of the plenary sessions of the Committees and Sub-Committees.13
3. Russia’s engagement in the Polar Code process
Altogether, there are 15 Russian submissions recorded in the IMO’s database in the
Polar Code. Moreover, there are three statements and four interventions included in
the reports of the Committees and Sub-Committees. In addition to these, a Russian
proposal or viewpoint is referenced three times in other delegations’ submissions: twice
by Norway as chair of the intersessional and working groups,14 and once by Canada.15
These numbers have to be put into perspective. Of the five Arctic coastal States,
Canada, Norway, and the United States submitted significantly more documents than
Russia: 34, 28, and 22, respectively.16 The number of Russian proposals is comparable
to those made by Finland and Denmark, with 14 and 12 proposals, respectively.
In addition to the number of submissions, there are a few other indicators that
show how engaged Russia was in the Polar Code process. Firstly, as indicated above,
there were three statements and four interventions recorded from Russia, more than
any other Arctic State. That Russia’s separate opinion was recorded indicates two
things: that Russia had a strong opinion on the matter at hand and that Russia’s
opinion differed from the other States that spoke on the issue.
Second, proposals submitted to the IMO’s Committees and Sub-Committees are
often co-sponsored, with two or more members or observers giving their name to the
same proposal. This way, multiple participants can show their support for the
proposal. In the case of the Polar Code negotiations, the other Arctic States had a
significant number of proposals co-sponsored by one another and by other, non-Arctic
States, showing an inclination to cooperate. Contrary to this, Russia did not
co-sponsor any proposals. Thus, the documents show a certain degree of isolation in
Russia’s participation in the Polar Code process. This applies to proposals before and
after the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. The cooling of relations between
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Russia and the West does not appear to have had an effect on this aspect of Russian
participation.
Third, as will be discussed below, many of the Russian proposals are responses to
previous submissions and decisions. In this sense, the Russian proposals are reactive
in nature, not proactive. Thus, Russia does not appear to be driving force in the
decision-making process, shaping the discussion. Rather, its submissions should be
seen as reactions to previous decisions and other members’ ideas.
Therefore, based on its submissions, statements, and interventions, Russia does
not fulfil the expectation that it would play a prominent, leading role in the Polar
Code negotiations. The factors above point to a surprising lack of prominence on
Russia’s part when compared to, first and foremost, the rest of the Arctic coastal
States. It is less surprising that Russia was more engaged than the remaining three
Arctic States that make up the so-called Arctic Eight, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden,
considering that these do not border on the marine Arctic.
4. Russian submissions in light of the IMO’s goals
4.1. Arguing and bargaining in deliberative theory
In order to provide a framework to analyse Russian submissions about the Polar Code,
I will first briefly introduce deliberative theory. Deliberative theory differentiates
between different forms of decision-making with distinct motives behind them.
As such, the theory will help determine where Russian priorities lay in the Polar Code
negotiations.
Central to deliberative theory is deliberation, or arguing, as a decision-making
mode. Deliberation is the exchange of reasoned arguments based on the communica-
tion of factual or normative assertions which claim to be valid.17 Validity here is based
on the truth and impartiality as well as the consistency of the arguments.18 However,
deliberation is not the only form of decision-making; it can be contrasted with
negotiation, or bargaining.19 As opposed to impartial arguments, bargaining involves
demands which claim credibility based on material resources that back up threats,
promises, and exit-options.20
What is more important to our discussion here is the contrast between the motives
behind arguing and bargaining. Deliberation relies on the power of the convincing
argument and, therefore, the main motive is disinterested and dispassionate reason.21
Meanwhile, the main feature of bargaining is a conflict of interests.22 The exchange of
reasoned, dispassionate arguments leads deliberation towards a common good that
can be found in consensus, whereas the outcome of bargaining should be imagined as
dividing a finite pie and, thus, can only result in a compromise.23
It has been highlighted that social norms stop States from openly reasoning in terms
of their own self-interest. This can lead to misrepresentation: presenting oneself as not
being influenced by interest, cloaking one’s message in reasoned arguments.24 Here
self-interested motives are disguised as impartial arguments; thus, arguments are used
strategically.25 One particular mode of misrepresentation is to disguise a threat as a
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warning.26 While such misrepresentation complicates the task of identifying reasoned
arguments, it is a good starting point to differentiate between what is a genuinely
impartial argument and what is an interested demand.
4.2. Arguing and bargaining in the context of polar shipping
How does the above discussion relate to Russia and the IMO’s goals with the Polar
Code? The exchange of reasoned arguments in deliberation moves the discussion
towards a common good, the aim of the deliberation.27 This can be linked to what
the IMO aimed to achieve with the Polar Code.
In general terms, the IMO, as a specialised organ of the United Nations for
international merchant shipping, works to benefit the international community at
large. The IMO is also considered the competent international organisation referred to
in various articles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)
that exercises quasi-legislative functions with regard to globally uniform minimum
standards.28 Indeed, one of the functions of the IMO as laid down in the convention
that established it, the 1948 Convention on the IMO,29 is ‘the drafting of conventions,
agreements, or other suitable instruments’,30 with the goal of creating standards for
shipping that are globally uniform and are applied in a uniform manner.31
However, it has been argued that the flexibility of the Polar Code, especially its
safety part, can be problematic for the creation of a uniform set of rules.32 A further
critique often heard is that the IMO’s outcomes represent the lowest common
denominator among its global membership. Contrary to these critiques, the position
taken in this article is that even ‘watered down’ standards are better than competing
and conflicting standards that divide the international community, or no standards at
all. Furthermore, flexibility is beneficial in an area where shipping is in its infancy
and where novel approaches might be called for.
While the creation of globally uniform standards is an important element of the
IMO’s goal, such a definition would not account for the content or the issues covered
by said standards. Therefore it is proposed here that the creation of a set of globally
uniform standards should rather be seen as an umbrella encompassing other goals of
the IMO. To find out what constitutes the substance of the IMO’s goals, we can turn
again to the Convention on the IMO. Article 1 of this convention lists the purposes of
the IMO, including:
to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards
in matters concerning the maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention
and control of marine pollution from ships . . .33
These goals are repeated and thus reinforced in the IMO’s mission statement:
The mission of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as a United
Nations specialized agency is to promote safe, secure, environmentally sound,
efficient and sustainable shipping through cooperation. This will be accomplished
by adopting the highest practicable standards of maritime safety and security,
efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of pollution from ships . . .34
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Turning specifically to polar shipping and how the IMO’s general goals translate into
the polar setting, the submissions proposing the creation of a mandatory Polar Code
emphasise the regulatory gap in the area, and highlight that
Establishing a mandatory set of requirements for ships operating in Polar Regions
will enhance the safety of life and protection of the marine environment in these
remote areas.35
This is reiterated in the Preamble and the Introduction of the Polar Code. While the
text of the Preamble can be seen more as embodying the spirit of the instrument than
a legal obligation, the Introduction is legally binding both through SOLAS and
MARPOL. Therefore, I use the latter to signify the substance of the IMO’s goals
with regard to the Polar Code. The Introduction states expressly:
The goal of this Code is to provide for safe ship operation and the protection of the
polar environment by assessing risks present in polar waters and not adequately
mitigated by other instruments of the Organization.36
Thus, in the following discussion, reference to IMO’s goals means the creation of
uniform standards to achieve the double aims of ship safety and protection of the
polar environment.37
Russia is a coastal State with an especially long and remote coastline, which makes
environmental clean-up extremely difficult. Furthermore, Russia’s activities in the
region, as well as vessels in transit, necessitate maritime safety. Therefore, the goals
of the IMO and the Polar Code can be said to serve Russia’s interest as well.
However, as the largest Arctic State, Russian interests in the region are diverse. Some
of these interests may differ from the goals the IMO aims to achieve with the Polar
Code, and can be linked to the motive of self-interest of the bargaining decision-
making mode. Therefore, the IMO’s goals, the common good towards which the
IMO has worked, can be explained in contrast to what it is not.
Much has been written about Russia’s strategic interests and policies regarding the
Arctic.38 Here, I will only introduce those interests which are important to this
discussion on Russian proposals about the Polar Code. First of all, in the domain of
international law, the legal status of some of the waters off of Russia’s northern coast,
and thus the extent of Russia’s coastal State sovereignty and jurisdiction there, is
contested. Russia relies heavily on the Arctic exception in LOSC, article 234, and its
coastal State right on that basis to adopt and enforce regulations along the NSR
without approval from the IMO.39 This right and practice have been contested by the
United States. It has been suggested that Russia would seek to gain international
legal recognition for these regulations through the Polar Code, or introduce similar
requirements to its own domestic rules, in case art. 234 becomes more controversial
in the future.40 Russia is also keen to use art. 234 and the perceived rights therein to
exert control over shipping for security reasons in an area that it sees as vulnerable
and where its strategic nuclear weapons are based.
On a more practical level, Russia has been keen to encourage international transit
shipping through the NSR, hoping for economic gains from increased activity.
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Yet, funds for necessary investments in infrastructure, including port facilities and
icebreakers, have been slow, creating delays.41 New international regulations leading
to further costs would not be helpful for Russian shipping aspirations. Beyond the
prospects of increased international shipping, domestic Russian activities in the
region include, notably, destinational shipping of natural resources and supplies to
regional settlements, as well as fishing. The fishing industry is especially important in
the Russian Far East where it provides for much needed employment, despite the
fact that it is in dire need of a new, seaworthy fleet.42 It is also worth noting that
Russia has been carrying out scientific research as well as surveying related to
hydrocarbons and its extended continental shelf. Thus, while Russia is an Arctic
coastal State, it also has significant interests related to shipping and navigation.43
In practice, Russia’s coastal State interests are often intertwined with its flag State
interests: to be able to enjoy its coastal State rights as regards fisheries and
hydrocarbon resources Russia relies on many Russian-flagged vessels, while to keep
control over transit along the NSR, Russian icebreakers are used. Russia regulates
fishing, survey vessels, and icebreakers not only in its flag State capacity, but also in
order to satisfy its interests as a coastal State.
4.3. Russian proposals
Having defined the IMO’s goal to create globally uniform minimum standards to
achieve safe ship operations in polar waters and to protect the polar environment, as
well as having established separate Russian interests in the Arctic, it is now possible
to start considering specific Russian submissions about the Polar Code. Did these
submissions contribute to the creation of uniform standards for maritime safety and
environmental protection, or did they promote other Russian interests?
The Russian proposals, statements, and interventions that are subject to this analysis
were concerned with four broad topics: 1) the role of the coastal State’s national
legislation; 2) environmental regulations, especially with a focus on discharges of oil
and oily mixtures; 3) the geographical scope of the Polar Code; and 4) systems for
determining limitations for ship operation in ice, including POLARIS.44 Furthermore,
it should be mentioned that a fifth issue espoused by Russia appears in two submissions
made by Norway, namely icebreaker assistance. In the following, each of these five
topics will be briefly introduced and analysed.
4.3.1. The role of the coastal State’s national legislation
Two Russian proposals took up the controversial issue of national regulations, with
express reference to LOSC art. 234.45 The first of these proposals, submitted to the
55th session of the DE Sub-Committee, cites the above-mentioned article
excessively, and makes reference to Russian legislation on navigation along the
NSR, professedly adopted in accordance with that article. This document leaves no
room to the imagination as to what the Russian Federation is aiming to achieve here.
The proposal endorses a principle previously included in a Canadian draft of the
Polar Code, namely ‘the principle of priority of national regulations over the Code’s
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requirements’,46 and proposes its re-introduction to the Preamble of the Polar Code
with the following text:
The Code is not intended to infringe on national systems of shipping control until a
harmonized system is in place; in addition to applicable sections of the Code, port,
Treaty and coastal States may retain local navigation rules and regulations for
certain routes and waterways under their jurisdiction taking into account local
conditions, infrastructure and procedures.47
The second proposal only contains one sentence on this topic, stating that ‘limita-
tions for navigation in ice conditions are imposed by . . . national rules adopted by
the coastal State empowered accordingly by article 234’.48 This subtle reference
is no doubt due to the concerns raised by the United States and others during
DE 55.49
While no further Russian proposals were submitted on the issue of national
regulations after DE 56’s decision to focus solely on technical matters, not
jurisdictional issues,50 one Canadian proposal includes a brief reference to Russia’s
support of Canada’s position on a savings clause, clarifying the relationship between
the Polar Code and other international agreements and international law, notably
LOSC.51
It should be relatively easy to see that these proposals were meant to further
Russia’s self-interests, rather than the IMO’s goal.52 First, on the issue of Russian
coastal State control over shipping along the NSR, it is in Russia’s interest to uphold
its regulations. Thus, when Russia gave its support to the ‘principle of priority of
national regulations over the Code’s requirements’ and suggested the inclusion of
text in the Polar Code stating that the ‘Code is not intended to infringe on national
systems of shipping control’,53 this is intended to serve as international legal
recognition of Russia’s interpretation of LOSC art. 234.
Second, giving priority to national regulations over the Polar Code is directly
opposite to what we have established as the IMO’s goal towards which the Polar Code
negotiations worked, namely uniform standards for safe ship operations and protection
of the polar environment. While uniform standards might be achieved, providing
expressed priority to national regulation over these standards undermines the intention
to apply them uniformly. Therefore, these Russian proposals are inconsistent with the
goal of uniform application.
While the above arguments are enough to categorise this topic as being motivated by
self-interest, we still need to look at what reasoning the submissions provided in
support of Russia’s proposals. DE 55/12/23, which suggests the inclusion of the
principle of priority, relies heavily on the coastal States’ rights under LOSC art. 234,
while also referring to the ‘necessary skills and knowledge on ensuring the safety of
navigation’54 possessed by the coastal States’ maritime authorities. DE 56/10/14 only
contains one sentence referring to the coastal State’s national rules, which again
highlights that these States are ‘empowered accordingly by article 234’.55 The
inclusion of this sentence in a submission otherwise denoted to ship categories related
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to ice-strengthening and ice thickness gives the impression that limitations imposed by
the national regulations of coastal States contribute to increasing ship safety.
Both of these Russian proposals include reference to the safety of ship operations.
Yet, both of them also emphasise the importance of LOSC art. 234, in which
Russia’s contested claims to jurisdiction are grounded. While the former reasoning
can be taken as pointing towards one substantive element of the IMO’s goal, the
latter casts doubt on this as the invocation of LOSC art. 234 serves to support the
acknowledgement of coastal State jurisdiction, one of Russia’s interests.
4.3.2. Environmental regulations relating to the discharge of oil and oily mixtures
While there are two Russian statements recorded in the report of DE 56 which are
more general in nature and concern many different types of vessel-source pollution,
ranging from grey water through heavy fuel oil to SOx and NOx emissions,56 the
bulk of Russian proposals related to the environment deal with the discharge of oil
and oily mixtures.
The first proposal that mentions the discharge of oil and oily mixtures was submitted
to DE 57.57 It is similarly broad in nature to the two Russian statements to DE 56.
Incidentally, this is the only proposal on this topic submitted before a decision was
made two months later at MEPC 65 to prohibit any discharge of oil and oily mixtures
from any ships in polar waters.58
Starting with the proposal made to SDC 1, Russian submissions addressing the
discharge of oil and oily mixtures from machinery spaces seem to continuously change
the scope of the Russian proposal, aiming at overturning the decision made
previously.59 This applies to both the kind of vessels exempted and the conditions
and circumstances under which discharges would be permitted. The range of vessels in
the Russian proposals narrows over time from all ships in the first submission, to ships
with structural features preventing compliance in a later submission, and finally to
ships operating in polar waters for longer periods of time. The proposed conditions
change from a general exception for these ships in the Arctic,60 to an exemption at the
Maritime Administration’s discretion, and then to a 5-year exemption period.
The discussion of environmental regulation related to the discharge of oil and oily
mixtures seems to be directly connected to the environmental protection part of
IMO’s goal. However, the Russian proposals urge less strict pollution prevention
rules than that agreed upon by MEPC. On the face of it, therefore, it seems that
these proposals are counter-productive to enhanced protection.
Furthermore, the fact that Russian proposals made after the MEPC’s decision
have continuously changed the scope suggests that these proposals were part of a
give-and-take on Russia’s part, in other words: bargaining. The line of proposals
starts with document SDC 1/3/18, a short document containing just one justifica-
tion: that the complete ban would be ‘extremely difficult to adhere to, given the
significant length of ships’ voyages’.61 The general lack of justification apparent here
is more of an indication of demand to agree with the Russian position than an
attempt at deliberation to convince the other States through reasoned arguments.
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A hidden demand can be observed in the audio records where Russia states in
relation to SDC 1/3/18:
we understand that the Sub-Committee may decide to go along with the MEPC
recommendation, but we’d like to inform you that we will actually be coming forth
with a similar proposal at the MEPC meeting.62
Another interesting feature of this submission is its espousal of conditions applicable
in MARPOL special areas and the requirement on oil filtering equipment with alarm
and automatic stopping arrangements. This is notable as Russia was previously
sceptical both of establishing such special areas in the Arctic, as well as using the
related requirements on oil filtering equipment.63 This inconsistency in Russia’s
stance can be evidential of self-interested bargaining.
Further submissions by Russia included more extensive reasoning to justify the
Russian proposals, often repeating the same justifications verbatim. Among these are
references to scientific research, highlighting that possible discharges in the region
were unlikely to pose an environmental threat, and suggesting that calls for a
complete ban were not well substantiated. The latter is not explained in further
detail, which leaves its truth-claim unverifiable and, thus, its convincing power
questionable. It is, therefore, doubtful if this reasoning can be taken as an argument
meant to be part of deliberation. Similarly, while some of the scientific research
referred to by the Russian proposals are cited, meaning their truth-claim can be
established, other passages in the submissions only mention research results in
general. The lack of verifiability and the inconsistency of citation within the same
proposals suggest the strategic use of arguments said to be based on research.
The proposals also retain the reasoning from SDC 1/3/18, and it is further specified
that the vessels likely to be negatively affected by a complete ban are ships operating in
the Arctic for months without calling at ports, such as ‘icebreakers, hydrographic
survey ships and research vessels’,64 as well as ships engaged in transit voyages. Thus,
complying with the ban would be potentially detrimental to Russian interests related to
maintaining its ability to provide icebreaker support. It could also prove discouraging
to transit shipping. Furthermore, warnings are also made in these proposals that a
complete ban would adversely affect shipping,65 and possibly lead to illegal discharges.
Finally, reference is made to Russia’s vast experience and the attention it pays to
maritime safety and environment protection. These claims can serve to provide
legitimacy to the repeated Russian demand to overturn the complete ban, and the
justifications brought forth to this end.
Related to the discharges of oil and oily mixtures in the Arctic, Russia also submitted
a proposal on reception facilities.66 This submission highlights the view that the
question of adequate reception facilities in the Arctic should not be regulated by the
Polar Code*contrary to the proposal of many flag States and shipping organisations
contained in document SDC 1/3/1.67
It is notable that in MEPC 67/9/4 Russia reasons that there is not a need for reception
facilities at each Arctic port, because of the limited nature of Arctic shipping. This
seems to be an attempt to argue with convincing, verifiable arguments. Indeed, a study
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by the reputable Det Norske Veritas (DNV) under the aegis of the Arctic Council’s
Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) is cited
in support of the Russian proposal. However, at the same time, reference is made to the
extremely burdensome nature of the requirement on reception facilities and the
considerable maintenance costs of such facilities, suggesting that including a
requirement to provide for reception facilities at each Arctic port would further add
to the costs and difficulties Russia is likely to experience in developing its Arctic
infrastructure. During debate on this issue, Russia highlighted that it was not the co-
sponsors of SDC 1/3/1 that would have to bear the costs of the proposed reception
facilities, and suggested, using non-diplomatic language, that it could agree to the
construction of such facilities if the co-sponsors were to fund it.68
On the whole, it seems that during the discussion of environmental regulations
relating to the discharge of oil and oily mixtures, Russia kept two of its interests in
mind. On the one hand, it tried to reduce the costs and difficulties for the shipping
industry by exempting some of the Russian vessels, as well as foreign vessels in
transit, from complying with the complete ban on oil and oily mixtures discharges,
thus, promoting Russian shipping activities in the Arctic, as well as transit shipping.
On the other hand, Russia sought to limit its own costs as a port State related to
infrastructure development, specifically in relation to the construction of reception
facilities in each Arctic port.
4.3.3. Icebreaker assistance
Russia briefly mentioned icebreaker escorts in a proposal to DE 54,69 and made an
intervention at DE 55, observing the lack of consideration given to the issue.70 These
early Russian proposals are limited to a discussion of the need for the inclusion of
rules on such escorts.71 Significantly, the intervention at DE 55 also warns that
safety of navigation in the Arctic regions adjoining the Russian Federation could not
be guaranteed without the aid of icebreakers, except for one or two months of the
year . . .72
Since this warning is included together with the observation that the issue of
icebreaker assistance had not previously been considered sufficiently with regard to
Russian submission DE 54/13/10, this can be taken as a hidden demand for more
discussion. Common to these documents are references to improved safety through
the use of icebreaker assistance and extended navigational seasons. It is true that
icebreaker assistance is often necessary to ensure safe passage in ice-covered waters
and, thus, the inclusion of regulation related to icebreakers can further the IMO’s
goal. However, the reference to safety can also be seen as indirectly providing
legitimacy to a Russian demand for further discussion on the issue, especially when
read together with the reference to extended navigational seasons. Again, the Russian
interest to open up the NSR to international transit shipping is noteworthy, as the
use of the NSR for extended navigational seasons was expected to generate more
income to the Russian authorities through various fees. At the time these documents
were submitted, the scope of the Russian Federation’s requirements for icebreaker
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escorts along the NSR was much wider than in the new 2013 NSR Rules. This can
be linked to the Russian statement that all ships are in need of icebreaker support.73
This brings us to a Russian proposal made to an intersessional working group on the
Polar Code, which is referred to in two Norwegian submissions, and the content of
which was included in the recommendatory part of the final version of the Polar Code.
The original submission is not publicly available and, therefore, it is not possible to
assess any reasoning given by Russia with regard to the proposal, which calls for setting
uniform procedures for icebreaker assistance for the maintenance of safety in
icebreaker operations. As such the proposal would seem to contribute to the IMO’s
safety goals. However, a noteworthy aspect of the proposal is its close similarity to
paragraphs 2630 of the Russian Rules of navigation in the water area of the Northern
Sea Route, dated 17 January 2013, a few months before the intersessional working
group which took place from 30 September to 4 October the same year. The report of
this meeting is the first document that mentions the Russian proposal on icebreakers.
Thus, the inclusion of these regulations appears to further both the IMO’s goal and
Russia’s interest to shape the Polar Code to its own needs.
4.3.4. The geographical scope of the Polar Code
While the Polar Code uses the same geographical area of application as regards
Russian waters as the 2002 and 2009 IMO Guidelines,74 the Russian Federation
attempted to modify this at later meetings. First, at SDC 1, Russia’s statement is
recorded to the effect that the geographical scope of the Polar Code should exclude
the northern part of the Bering Sea.75 This was followed by a proposal and
intervention at MSC 93.76
The reasoning used by Russia to justify changing the geographical scope of
application of the Polar Code was based on hazards specific to the polar region as
well as on the ‘available experience of shipping in polar areas’.77 The hazards include
the characteristics of the Bering Sea, which make it, in Russia’s opinion, a freezing
sea that should not be covered by the Polar Code, rather than an Arctic sea.
Furthermore, the lack of polar day and polar night, no high latitude zone and the
availability of search and rescue services were also mentioned. These reasons seem to
be unbiased and their truth-claims should be easily verifiable.
What is more interesting is that this Russian proposal was made relatively late in
the Polar Code process, considering that the geographical boundaries had been used
in the preceding discussions. With regard to the definition of Arctic waters, Russia
states that
we consider that such a straight transfer of these provisions into a mandatory IMO
instrument is not relevant, bearing in mind the importance of the future Code for
navigation in Arctic polar waters.78
This formulation seems to imply that, for Russia, what makes the difference is
whether the IMO instrument is mandatory, not whether operating in the waters in
question and the additional hazards present there require new safety or environ-
mental regulations. This is contrary to IMO’s aims with the Polar Code.
D. Bognar
122
Russia also suggests that a change in geographical scope should be justified by the
actual practice of polar shipping, which provides a clue of Russia’s interest in this
matter. Along with ships transiting the Bering Strait, to which the Polar Code would
apply anyway, Russia also mentions fishing vessels and fishing support vessels. The
submission states that these vessels typically navigate near the ice edge,
thus rendering the application of the Polar Code’s requirements in their entirety
impractical, and reducing fishing areas to a significant extent.79
The Polar Code does not concern the regulation of fishing; therefore, the suggestion
that fishing areas would be reduced seems out of place. However, the planned phase-
2 of the Polar Code will regulate fishing vessels.80 Furthermore, MARPOL currently
applies to such vessels.81 Therefore, the geographical scope of the Polar Code will
impact the largely unseaworthy fishing fleet of the Russian Far East, on which many
livelihoods depend.82
Furthermore, Russia also claims that its own regulations on the NSR treat the
northern part of the Bering Sea separately from the NSR and that this approach is
vindicated by the lack of negative effects on navigational safety in Russia’s ‘many-
year experience of shipping along the Northern Sea Route’.83 Thus, while the
Russian proposals to exclude the northern part of the Bering Sea from the Polar
Code also rely on factual claims whose content is verifiable and accordingly can be
used as arguments in deliberation, another motive for these proposals is self-interest
in the Russian fishing fleet, as well as correspondence of the Polar Code’s
geographical scope with that of Russia’s NSR regulations.
4.3.5. POLARIS and other systems for determining limitations for ship operation in ice
To determine the limitations of ship operation in ice and, thus, to make the Polar Code
more practically applicable, the International Association of Classification Societies
(IACS) developed the POLARIS system based on the contributions of Canada,
Finland, Russia and Sweden. Even though Russia did contribute to the work on
POLARIS, three of its proposals to MSC 94 served to criticise and discredit the
system.84
In its attempt to include POLARIS in a separate instrument, outside the Polar
Code, Russia highlights detailed technical problems with POLARIS, including the
combination of speed and ice thickness, lack of testing, and problems with the
Canadian system that POLARIS is mainly based on. The content of these
justifications is verifiable and, thus, may be part of deliberation to produce uniform
standards for navigational safety.
Yet, in MSC 94/3/22 Russia discusses at length its suggestion that the prescriptive
approach to limitations for ship operations, practiced by Russia, should have equal
status to methods based on risk assessment, including POLARIS and the Canadian
approach. While it serves the common interest of safety to require each system to
have sufficient experience before approval, the general proposal that
methods based on risk assessment . . . may be recommended for application after
some experience of their use is available,85
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also seems to encompass the Canadian system, and would then, in practice, not
create equal status for the two approaches.
Furthermore, Russia proposes an amendment to the POLARIS system with
Russian ice classes based on prescriptive requirements and Russian shipping
experience in the Arctic, since
this step will definitely make the modelling and approaches of POLARIS much
more profound and widely applicable especially in the Arctic region along the
Northern part of the Russian Federation.86
The separate emphasis on Russian waters, together with Russia’s insistence on equal
status for its own approach to operational limitation, seems to signal that Russia
wants to retain its influence over ships off its coast. As a flag state it could require its
vessels to use the prescriptive, Russian approach, highlighted by Russia’s insistence
on the right of the maritime administration to specifically approve the use of novel
operational restriction systems. By modifying the POLARIS system to include the
Russian approach, Russia would also have indirect influence over foreign-flagged
vessels operating in its waters under POLARIS.
Thus, while Russia can be seen to be contributing to navigational safety by
pointing out technical problems with POLARIS,87 this points in the same direction
as Russia’s wish to exclude POLARIS from the Polar Code. Both objectives are
served by Russia’s proposal to develop POLARIS further by amending it with
Russian rules, as POLARIS will not be included in the Polar Code as long as it is
under amendment.
4.4. Conclusion: self-interested bargaining or arguing to further the IMO’s goals?
The definition of the IMO’s goal as the development of uniform standards to achieve
safe ship operation and the protection of the polar environment has two elements to it:
the development of globally uniform standards and their content, the safety of ship
operations, and/or the protection of the polar environment. Of the five main themes
identified and discussed above, it is the issue of icebreaker assistance which comes
closest to fulfilling both elements of this definition. The proposal for icebreaker
assistance does serve to promote the safety of ship operation in polar waters and aims at
uniform rules. Even though it ended up in the recommendatory section of the Polar
Code, the original proposal seems to have contained mandatory language.88 Without
knowledge of the original submission, it is impossible to assess what justifications were
used by Russia. However, the correspondence of the proposed text and that of the
Russian legislation seems to indicate that, while the proposal contributed to uniform
standards for ship safety, it also furthered Russia’s self-interest.
In the case of POLARIS, Russia’s technical comments as well as its insistence on
further testing could be seen to serve maritime safety. It is, however, more
questionable whether the Russian proposals contributed to uniform standards.
First, as was pointed out, Russia promoted equal status for the two approaches to
operation limitation, thus also furthering its own interests. Second, the fact that
POLARIS was excluded from the Polar Code, an outcome Russia proposed in its
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submissions, makes it more likely that a uniform operation limitation system will not
be reached.
With regard to environmental regulations and the geographical scope of the Polar
Code, it is not clear how proposals under either of these areas would contribute to
safe ship operations or the protection of the polar environment. In both cases,
Russian interests were easily identifiable insofar as reference to them was already
included in the proposals. Furthermore, we witness an attempt at bargaining in the
series of Russian submissions on the issue of oil and oily mixtures discharges. Finally,
the Russian submissions concerning coastal State regulations neither contributed to
setting uniform standards, nor did they contribute to further navigational safety or
environment protection aims.
5. Discussion
Having explored the question in Section 3 as to how prominent a role Russia played
in the Polar Code negotiations, as well as in Section 4 as to whether Russia utilised its
experience to further the development of uniform rules on safety and environment
protection, or to serve its own self-interests, the article now turns to a more general
discussion. In the following pages, a couple of conclusions about Russia’s
participation in the Polar Code process are offered. On the basis of these
conclusions, and the findings of the previous section, I examine what can be said
about Russia as an Arctic State and about what kind of actor Russia is in the Arctic.
5.1. Reaction versus proaction
Most of the Russian topics discussed in this article can be characterised as reactive
rather than proactive. The Russian proposal to include the principle of priority of
national regulations over the Polar Code can be seen as a result of the same principle
having been omitted from documents after its initial suggestion by Canada. In the
case of the regulation of oil and oily mixture discharges, the Russian proposals were a
direct result of MEPC 65’s decision to ban all such discharges. The proposal on
reception facilities came after a provision was included in square brackets in the draft
of the Polar Code regarding the coastal State’s obligation to provide adequate
reception facilities in all ports in the Arctic.89 Discussion on the geographical scope
of the Polar Code was opened by Russia even though the definition of Arctic waters
had been used in previous sessions. Indeed, one of the reasons cited in MSC 93’s
report for rejecting the Russian proposal is that the geographical boundaries had
already been agreed upon.90 Russia’s opposition to POLARIS was brought about by
the possibility that POLARIS would be incorporated into the Polar Code.
Of these issues, Russia successfully prevented the inclusion of POLARIS and
mandatory reception facilities, both of which are areas where decisions had not been
reached previously. In the case of geographical scope and discharges, Russia even
tried to reopen the debate on issues that had already been agreed upon, thus being
counter-productive to the timely adoption of the Polar Code.
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The most proactive of the Russian submissions is its proposal for the regulation of
icebreaker assistance. Russia did achieve its inclusion in the Polar Code, albeit in the
recommendatory section.
5.2. Modes of furthering self-interests
As demonstrated above, most of the Russian proposals were not concerned with
contributing to the creation of uniform standards for ship safety and environmental
protection. Even those submissions that contained elements of this, for example
those on icebreaker assistance and POLARIS, can be linked to Russian State
interests. How did Russia go about prioritising its own self-interests?
One of the most important issues for Russia with regard to jurisdiction in the
Arctic is the question of domestic coastal State regulation based on LOSC art. 234
and international regulation through the IMO. In relation to this issue, the DE Sub-
Committee’s 56th session seems to be a watershed. At DE 56, as a response to
Canadian and Russian proposals touching upon coastal State jurisdiction, it was
decided that priority would be given to technical instead of legal issues, which could
be discussed at a later point in time.91 This decision seems to have led to an
observable change in the activity of Russia.
First, the number and composition of the documents submitted by Russia
changed. Before the decision of DE 56, Russia submitted four proposals, and five
statements and interventions were included in reports.92 After DE 56, the number of
Russian proposals was eleven, along with just one statement and one intervention.
Additionally, it was in this period that Russia submitted its proposal on icebreaker
assistance to the intersessional working group. Having taken place in early 2012, DE
56 was roughly half-way through the development process of the Polar Code,
between 2009 and 2015. Thus, the first period of the negotiations featured half as
many Russian proposals, while the number of statements and interventions recorded
in the final reports shrunk markedly in the second period of the negotiations.
Second, there was also a difference in the content of the submissions before and
after DE 56. Prior to DE 56, the Russian documents were mainly concerned with
more technical aspects such as icebreaking capability, ice classes, and icebreaker
escorting. One of the proposals discussed in relation to coastal State regulations deals
largely with such issues. However, proposals submitted after DE 56 dealt with a
larger variety of*and more interest-laden*topics.
Interestingly, while the priority of national regulations espoused by Russia does not
re-occur in documents submitted after DE 56, Canada made reference to Russia’s
support for the inclusion of a savings clause into the amendment of the MARPOL
Annexes, which made the Polar Code mandatory.93 While Canada expressed the
belief that the savings clause would make the relationship between the Polar Code and
other international agreements and international law, notably LOSC, clear,94 in effect
the savings clause also serves to safeguard the Arctic coastal States’ rights with regard
to national legislation under LOSC art. 234. Thus, it seems that, after DE 56, the
Russian delegation was more circumvent. On the one hand, its practical pro-
posals supported coastal State interests, often intertwined with flag State interests.
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These proposals included the question of oil and oily mixtures discharges from
icebreakers and survey vessels, rules of icebreaker assistance, the geographical scope of
the Code as well as operational limitations through POLARIS. On the other hand,
insofar as Russia supported the Canadian proposals on savings clauses, Russia’s
interests relating to coastal State legislation were clad in a language regarding legal
clarity, instead of directly relating to the rights enshrined in art. 234. Furthermore,
Russian support for these proposals meant support for a possibly wider application
and stronger effect for the savings clauses. This is because these savings clauses were
proposed for the chapters making the Polar Code mandatory in the parent
Conventions, SOLAS and MARPOL, and not in the Code itself as originally
envisaged. Being included in SOLAS and MARPOL would make these savings
clauses stronger, while also possibly allowing them to influence the interpretation of
other provisions of the Conventions not directly related to the Polar Code.
Thus, while the principle of priority of national regulations was dropped by Russia
after it was rejected at DE 56, this did not mean that Russia stopped trying to
prioritise its own State interests.
5.3. Russia’s experience in Arctic shipping
A running thread of justification found throughout the documents submitted by
Russia is reference to Russia’s experience in Arctic shipping. The supposed
superiority of this experience is underscored by characterising it as ‘vast’, ‘extensive’,
‘many-year’, and ‘100 year’.95 Implicit in these references to Russia’s experience is
the claim that Russia knows better, Russia’s proposal is more valid. While Russia
does have a long history of shipping off its Arctic coast, it is questionable whether
such a justification is relevant to, for example, where the boundaries of the Polar
Code’s geographical scope should be drawn. Technical areas, such as icebreaking
and ice-strengthening, lend themselves better to justification on the grounds of
extensive experience in polar shipping. Yet, the small number of Russian proposals
submitted during the Polar Code negotiations in general and the even smaller
number on the topic of navigational safety, are surprising in light of the eagerness to
highlight Russia’s vast experience in Arctic shipping apparent in Russia’s proposals.
One element of this justification based on Russian experience is reference to the
suitability of pre-existing Russian legislation on shipping along the NSR, such as
when Russia makes a case for excluding the northern part of the Bering Sea from the
geographical scope of the Polar Code. The adequacy of the Russian legislation is
again based on the Russian polar shipping experience and, thus, should serve as a
leading guide in the formulation of the Polar Code. While the justification for
Russia’s proposal on icebreaker assistance is not publicly available, the same rationale
appears to shine through this proposal, in that it mirrors Russian NSR regulations
regarding icebreaker assistance.
An interesting aspect of the emphasis on Russian polar shipping experience is that
it frames the Russian Federation not so much as a coastal State, but more as the State
with the most extensive use of the Arctic waters, a maritime Arctic State. Thus, while
Russia is undoubtedly an Arctic coastal State with interests related to that, the
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reference to its superior knowledge of polar shipping serves to point out that it also
has maritime interests inasmuch as a great deal of its Arctic activities require
shipping off its northern coast.
5.4. Russia, the Arctic actor
On the basis of the above, there seems to be a discrepancy between Russia’s
self-image and the reality of its participation in the Polar Code process. Russia’s
self-image as the main user of Arctic waters with superior knowledge of polar
shipping, as well as Russia’s extensive reference to this as justification for its
proposals, implies that Russia should take a leading position in questions of
Arctic shipping. From the stance of Russia, Russia’s proposals and views should
be given more weight in debates, as Russia has the most relevant knowledge and
understanding.
Yet, as has been shown, Russia’s partaking in the Polar Code negotiations can be
characterised by a reactive approach to the debate, a somewhat isolated position
among the Arctic States and inconspicuous activity considering Russia’s size and
importance in the Arctic and, not least, its self-image. Leadership is, of course, not
established by the numbers of proposals submitted. However, analysis of the content
of the Russian submissions shows that, rather than demonstrating leadership on a
wide array of issues, Russia pragmatically picked issue areas where it saw its own
interests affected. It becomes clear then that Russia favours national regulations over
uniform international standards and its own interests over the goals of the IMO, that
is, the wider international community.
When looking at the Russian interests put forward in its submissions, it is clear
that Russia is not just a coastal State, nor just a maritime user State of Arctic waters,
but an actor with a wide array of interests in the Arctic. Russia acted in its capacity as
a coastal State both with regard to safeguarding national regulations and over the
question of reception facilities.96 In its attempts to maintain control over shipping
along the NSR, Russia acted on its security concerns. It acted in its shipping interest
when the question of oil and oily mixture discharges from machinery spaces was
debated. Russia acted in its interest relating to fishing when wanting to change the
geographical scope of application of the Polar Code. And even though it proposed
laxer standards on oil and oily mixture discharges from machinery spaces, Russia did
not oppose strict standards on, for example, discharges of noxious liquid substances
or untreated sewage. In some cases, therefore, Russia also kept its environmental
interests in mind*after all, it has the longest Arctic coastline and clean-up could
prove impossible or very costly. Thus, Russia should not be seen as a one-sided actor
in the Arctic. Russia has many interests in the region and, in its work on the Polar
Code, Russia tried to protect all of these interests, unlike its self-image suggests.
6. Conclusion
The analysis of material from the IMO’s database shows that the Russian experience
in Arctic shipping did not translate into extensive contributions to the development
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of uniform standards for safe ship operation and environment protection in polar
areas. First, it has been shown that Russian activity in tabling proposals lagged
behind, notably, that of Canada and the United States. Moreover, the majority of the
Russian proposals were reactive rather than proactive. Second, the majority of the
issue areas and actions Russia espoused did not contribute substantially to
navigational safety or protection of the environment, while some of its proposals
effectively acted against the aim of creating globally uniform minimum standards.
Therefore, Russia’s contribution to the Polar Code in general cannot be said to have
aided the achievement of the goals which States set out at the onset of the Polar Code
negotiations.
Most of the Russian proposals seem to have an underlying motive of self-interest.97
These interests include upholding Russia’s legal, jurisdictional claims as regards the
NSR and control over vessels. Russian interests are also linked to the possibly
burdensome and negatively perceived consequences of future implementation of the
Polar Code’s regulations: financial and economic implications, such as upgrading
Russian icebreakers, survey and research vessels, and fishing fleet; discouragement of
international transit shipping through the NSR98; and the burden of providing for
adequate reception facilities in each Arctic port. Russia furthered these interests in a
pragmatic manner in its proposals, showing that it has a holistic identity in the Arctic
setting*as opposed to a distinctly coastal State identity or the maritime user identity
emphasised by the Russian proposals.
Regulation regarding fishing vessels are set to come up in the planned phase-2 of
the Polar Code, along with other non-SOLAS vessels, such as pleasure crafts and
mobile offshore drilling units. It will be interesting to see whether there will be a
noticeable change in Russia’s approach and participation in the negotiations during
phase-2, since it will touch on issues vital to the Russian fishing and offshore
hydrocarbon extraction industries. Will Russia continue to further its own interests
above the goals set out by the IMO and only pay lip-service to international
cooperation in the Arctic? Will Russia continue to be reactive and not share its
experience for the benefit of the international community? Or, will Russia live up to
its own image as a leading Arctic State with many years of experience in polar
shipping?
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank Prof. Hans-Kristian Hernes, UiT The Arctic
University of Tromsø, for his continuous support, as well as Prof. Erik J. Molenaar,
Netherlands Institute for Law of the Sea, Utrecht University, and K.G. Jebsen
Centre for the Law of the Sea, UiT; and Arild Moe, Senior Research Fellow at
Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, Norway for their review and comments. This
work would not have been possible without the help of an environmental NGO with
consultative status at the IMO. This article is part of the project ‘Arctic Shipping
through Challenging Waters’, financed by the Research Council of Norway.
Russian proposals on the Polar Code
129
NOTES
1. IMO Res. MSC.385(94), adopted on 21 November 2014; and IMO Res. MEPC.264(68),
adopted on 15 May 2015.
2. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, London, 1 November 1974.
3. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as Modified by the
Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto, London, 2 November 1973 and 17 February 1978.
4. The Polar Code will enter into force through the tacit acceptance procedure of SOLAS and
MARPOL. The Code contains additional regulations to those previously found in the main
IMO Conventions, and complements other IMO regulations.
5. Pavel K. Baev, ‘Russia’s Arctic Policy. Geopolitics, Mercantilism and Identity-Building’, UPI
Briefing Paper 73 (2010): 57; Marlene Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the
Far North (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2014), 2446.
6. For a definition of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF), see Russian
Federation, Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period till 2020
and for a Further Perspective, 2008. For a discussion of the geographical terminology of the
Russian Arctic, see Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies, supra n. 5, 2833. For an
interpretation of the AZRF as a reinvention of the Soviet sector doctrine, see Lincoln E.
Flake, ‘Forecasting Conflict in the Arctic: The Historical Context of Russia’s Security
Intentions’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 28, no. 1 (2015): 946.
7. Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies, supra n. 5, 13567.
8. The NSR as a concept originates from Russian legislation where it is defined as ‘the
historically emerged national transportation route of the Russian Federation’, see Russian
Federation, Federal Law on Amendments to Specific Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation
Related to Governmental Regulation of Merchant Shipping in the Water Area of the Northern Sea
Route, signed 28 July 2012, published 30 July 2012. The NSR does not entirely overlap with
the Northeast Passage, as the former spans from Novaya Zemlya to the Bering Strait.
9. Russian Federation, Basic Strategy, supra n. 6. In spite of, and maybe because of, the fall in
traffic along the NSR in recent years, plans are being drawn up to make shipping along the NSR
more viable, see Trude Pettersen, ‘Medvedev Orders Plan to Increase Northern Sea Route
Capacity’, Barents Observer, 10 June 2015, http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/06/
medvedev-orders-plan-increase-northern-sea-route-capacity-10-06 (accessed 11 June 2015).
10. These instruments are the 2012 Federal Law, supra n. 8, and Russian Federation, Rules of
Navigation on the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route, dated 17 January 2013. For an
introduction to these instruments, see Jan J. Solski, ‘New Developments in Russian
Regulation of Navigation on the Northern Sea Route’, Arctic Review on Law and Politics 4,
no. 1 (2013): 90119.
11. As a result of the reorganisation of the IMO’s Sub-Committees in 2013, the 57th session of the
DE Sub-Committee (DE 57) was followed by the 1st session of the SDC Sub-Committee
(SDC 1), instead of DE 58.
12. Accessible after registration at https://webaccounts.imo.org/.
13. The available audio records start from DE 57 in 2012 and are accessible to delegates
through IMODOCS. The present author was provided access by one of the environmental
NGOs with consultative status at the IMO.
14. Chairman of the working group, Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar
Waters: Report of the Intersessional Working Group, IMO Doc. SDC 1/3, 10 October 2013; and
Norway, Ship Design and Construction: Draft Polar Code, Part I-B, IMO Doc. MSC 94/INF.4,
4 March 2014.
15. Canada, Reports of Sub-Committees: Comments on the outcome of SDC 1: Amendments to the
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol of 1978
Relating to Thereto (MARPOL), MEPC 66/11/7, 21 February 2014.
D. Bognar
130
16. In the case of Norway, it should be noted that part of its submissions were written as chair of
a correspondence or intersessional working group entrusted with the detailed work on the
Polar Code between the sessions of the Committees and Sub-Committees. The United
States also submitted five proposals to Sub-Committees other than DE and SDC.
17. Jon Elster, ‘Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies’, University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 2, no. 2 (2000): 3724. For a summary of
Elster’s arguing and bargaining and its reformulation, see Thomas Saretzki, ‘From
Bargaining to Arguing, from Strategic to Communicative Action? Theoretical Distinctions
and Methodological Problems in Empirical Studies of Deliberative Policy Processes’, Critical
Policy Studies 3, no. 2 (2009): 15764.
18. Elster, ‘Arguing and Bargaining’, supra n. 17, 3737; Saretzki, ‘From Bargaining to
Arguing’, supra n. 17, 158; and Mark E. Warren et al., ‘Deliberative Negotiation’, in
Negotiating Agreement in Politics, ed. Jane Mansbridge et al. (Washington DC: APSA, 2013),
93.
19. Elster, ‘Arguing and Bargaining’, supra n. 17, 3712; and Saretzki, ‘From Bargaining to
Arguing’, supra n. 17, 15764. In the present article, the term ‘bargaining’ is preferred over
‘negotiation’, so as to differentiate between bargaining and the IMO’s negotiations of the
Polar Code. The latter is not intended to imply that the Polar Code process was dominated
by bargaining.
20. Elster, ‘Arguing and Bargaining’, supra n. 17, 392; and Saretzki, ‘From Bargaining to
Arguing’, supra n. 17, 1589.
21. Jon Elster, ‘Introduction’, in Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 6.
22. Ibid.
23. See table in Warren et al., ‘Deliberative Negotiation’, supra n. 18, 93a, and for a description
of different negotiation outcomes, 9498.
24. Jon Elster, ‘Deliberation and Constitution Making’, in Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1014.
25. Elster, ‘Arguing and Bargaining’, supra n. 17, 40614. There is also what I consider a version
of strategically used arguments, legitimacy talk through indirect speech, where one disguises
demands with reference to universal values, thereby giving legitimacy to one’s claim. See
Matthew D. Stephen, ‘‘Can You Pass the Salt?’ The Legitimacy of International Institutions
and Indirect Speech’, European Journal of International Relations 21, no. 4 (2015): 76892.
26. Elster, ‘Arguing and Bargaining’, supra n. 17, 4148.
27. Jane Mansbridge et al., ‘Norms of Deliberation: An Inductive Study’, Journal of Public
Deliberation 2, no. 1 (2006): 25; and Mark E. Warren et al., ‘Deliberative Negotiation’,
supra n. 18, 94.
28. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982. See
also, Aldo Chircop, ‘The International Maritime Organization’, in The Oxford Handbook of
the Law of the Sea, ed. Donald R. Rothwell et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015),
42931.
29. Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Geneva, 6 March 1948.
30. Ibid., art. 2 (b).
31. In the Arctic setting, the Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report
recommended support for the IMO’s efforts in harmonising international standards relating
to ship operations in the Arctic.
32. Tore Henriksen, ‘The Polar Code: Ships in Cold Water*Arctic Issues Examined’, CMI
Yearbook 2014 (2014): 344.
33. Convention on the IMO, supra n. 29, art. 1 (a).
34. IMO, Strategic Plan for the Organization (20132017), Assembly Res. A.1037(27), 22
November 2011, Annex 1.
Russian proposals on the Polar Code
131
35. Denmark, Norway and the United States, Work Programme: Mandatory Application of the
Polar Guidelines, IMO Doc. MSC 86/23/9, 24 February 2009, 4; and Denmark, Norway and
the United States, Work Programme of the Committee and Subsidiary Bodies: Mandatory
Application of the Polar Guidelines, IMO Doc. MEPC 59/20/1, 6 April 2009, 4.
36. IMO Res. MSC.385(94) and MEPC.264(68), supra n. 1, Introduction 1.
37. A similar approach was suggested by Bai when discussing the underlying principles of the
Polar Code. She identifies the principles of non-discrimination, which can be linked to the
equal application of uniform standards, and safety of life at sea and pollution prevention as
‘substantive principles of Arctic shipping governance’. Jiayu Bai, ‘The IMO Polar Code: The
Emerging Rules of Arctic Shipping Governance’, The International Journal of Marine and
Coastal Law 30, no. 4 (2015): 680.
38. See, for example, Heather A. Conley and Caroline Rohloff, ‘The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s
Strategic Reach to the Arctic’, Report of the CSIS Europe Program, 2015; Laruelle, Russia’s
Arctic Strategies, supra n. 5.
39. Article 234 provides coastal States with the ‘right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory
laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from
vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone’. For a
discussion on the international legal basis of the NSR regime, see Solski, ‘New Develop-
ments’, supra n. 10, 94103; and Albert Buixadé Farré et al., ‘Commercial Arctic shipping
through the Northeast Passage: Routes, Resources, Governance, Technology, and Infra-
structure’, Polar Geography 37, no. 4 (2014): 30911.
40. Andrea Scassola, ‘An International Polar Code of Navigation: Consequences and
Opportunities for the Arctic’, The Yearbook of Polar Law V (2013): 2867. See also the
concerns raised by several delegations during the Polar Code negotiations, IMO, Report to
the Maritime Safety Committee, Doc. DE 55/22, 15 April 2011, para. 12.7.
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